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Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and a New Path for 
Transgender Rights
Kevin Barry and Jennifer Levi
abstract. Since the Supreme Court recognized marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
civil rights advocates have increasingly set their sights on transgender rights as the next legal
frontier. Sex discrimination law, though an essential statutory tool, is not the only potential ave­
nue for securing rights for transgender individuals. Another important federal source of protec­
tion for transgender people is disability rights law—in particular, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). Disability rights law, unlike sex discrimination law, applies to public accommoda­
tions and government services, and also mandates reasonable accommodations. A transgender
litigant successfully invoked the protections of the ADA for the first time in the recent case of
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., where a federal court ruled that transgender people are not categori­
cally barred from seeking relief under the ADA from discrimination based on gender dysphoria— 
the clinically significant distress that some transgender people experience. Importantly, the De­
partment of Justice under both the Obama and Trump Administrations has similarly interpreted
the ADA to cover such discrimination. This Essay explores why, for over twenty-five years,
transgender litigants have not invoked the protections of the ADA—and why they now should.
Blatt’s historic holding will reverberate beyond the facts of that case, setting the stage for ADA
challenges to a broad range of discrimination against transgender people who experience stigma 
and bias associated with gender dysphoria.
Since the Supreme Court’s historic decision recognizing marriage equality
in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 transgender rights have quickly emerged as one of the
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
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most important frontiers for civil rights.2 Transgender individuals’ access to
appropriate gender-segregated facilities, particularly restrooms, has taken cen­
ter stage in this debate.3 On April 19, 2016, in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
County School Board, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals
to rule that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits a school
from excluding a transgender boy from the boys’ student restroom, relying on
agency guidance issued by the Obama Administration.4 Although the Supreme
Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment a�er the Trump Administration
rescinded that guidance,5 other federal courts appear poised to reach the same
conclusion on other grounds. The Seventh Circuit, which recently upheld a
preliminary injunction allowing a transgender boy to use the boys’ student re­
stroom at his school, noted that the court was “not alone in [its] belief” that
Title IX encompasses discrimination against transgender people.6 
2. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell Could Help Transgender Rights, SLATE
(June 26, 2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/06/26/obergefell 
_and_trans_rights_the_supreme_court_s_endorsement_of_identity.html [http://perma.cc 
/JY5B-V7H9].
3. Understanding Transgender Access Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/02/24/us/transgender-bathroom-law.html [http://perma.cc/2JZ2-9HHA].
4. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted
in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
5. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t of Edu., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Stu­
dents (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702
-title-ix.docx [http://perma.cc/RUZ3-LTMS] (withdrawing and rescinding the Obama
Administration guidance). On October 4, 2017, the Trump Administration likewise with­
drew guidance issued by the Obama Administration that interpreted Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employment discrimination based on gender identity per se, 
including transgender status. Compare Memorandum from the U.S. Att’y Gen’l to U.S.
Att’ys on Revised Treatment of Transgender Discrimination Claims Under Title VII 2 (Oct. 
4, 2017), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4067437/Sessions-memo-reversing
-gender-identity-civil.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6JK-B4UK] (withdrawing Obama Admin­
istration guidance), with Memorandum from the U.S. Att’y Gen’l to U.S. Att’ys on
Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII 1
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2014/12/Title-VII-Memo 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JZ2-MJQZ] (interpreting Title VII to prohibit “discrimination based
on gender identity in and of itself”). Here, as in the Title IX context, the weight of judicial
authority is against the Trump Administration’s interpretation. See infra note 6 and accom­
panying text.
6. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing
the decisions of two other circuit courts, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, and six district
courts that concluded that discrimination against transgender people constitutes sex dis­
crimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other sex antidiscrimination
statutes); see also Examples of Court Decisions Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimi­
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blatt v. cabela's retail, inc. and a new path for transgender rights
The legal issue at the heart of these cases centers on whether federal sex
discrimination law fully extends to transgender students. Does Title IX (and,
by extension, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other federal laws prohibit­
ing sex discrimination) provide comprehensive equality guarantees to
transgender individuals, as Gavin Grimm argues?7 Or do cultural and societal
norms regarding gender justify gaps in the laws’ coverage?8 
These are important questions for transgender rights. Although sex dis­
crimination law is an essential statutory tool for securing transgender rights, it
is not the only one. Disability rights law—which, unlike sex discrimination law,
applies to public accommodations and government services, and also mandates
reasonable accommodations—is another important federal source of protection
for transgender people.9 In particular, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (“ADA”), which prohibits discrimination based on “disability” in a broad
range of public and private settings,10 has profound implications for the ad­
vancement of transgender rights. In a recent landmark case, Blatt v. Cabela’s Re­
tail, Inc.,11 a federal court ruled for the first time that transgender people are
not categorically barred from seeking relief from discrimination under the
ADA. Importantly, the Department of Justice under both the Obama and
Trump Administrations has similarly interpreted the ADA to cover such dis­
crimination.12 
nation Under Title VII, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc 
/newsroom/wysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm [http://perma.cc/JL3H-MQX3] (compil­
ing federal court decisions supporting coverage for transgender individuals as sex discrimi­
nation).
7. See G.G., 822 F.3d at 718-19 (discussing plaintiff ’s argument that court should give control­
ling weight to the 2015 Department of Education opinion letter stating that “[w]hen a
school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school gen­
erally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity”).
8. See id. at 721 (discussing the view that “maleness and femaleness [a]re determined primarily
by reference to the factors the district court termed ‘biological sex,’ namely reproductive or­
gans”).
9. 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq. (2012).
10. Id.
11. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
12. Compare Second Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 16, 2015) (No. 5:14-CV-04822) [hereina�er Second Statement] (“In light of the
evolving scientific evidence suggesting that gender dysphoria may have a physical ba­
sis, . . . the GID Exclusion should be construed narrowly such that gender dysphoria
falls outside its scope.”), with Statement of Interest of the United States at 3, Doe v. Arrisi,
No. 3:16-CV-08640 (D.N.J. July 17, 2017) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff has alleged that her [Gender
Dysphoria] resulted from a ‘physical impairment,’ . . . by definition she has alleged that
she falls within the statutory protections of the ADA.”).
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This Essay explores why, for over twenty-five years, transgender litigants
have not invoked the protections of the ADA—and why they now should. In
Part I, the Essay discusses the ADA’s morality-driven exclusion of three condi­
tions associated with transgender people, and how this exclusion has led
transgender litigants to eschew disability rights law in favor of sex discrimina­
tion protections. In Part II, we turn to Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.,13 in which
the court held that gender dysphoria—the clinically significant distress that
some transgender people experience14 —constitutes a protected disability un­
der the ADA. We also discuss well-intentioned but misguided concerns regard­
ing ADA coverage of gender dysphoria, and why the consensus of the
transgender rights community is firmly in support of such coverage. In Part III,
this Essay traces a new path forward for transgender rights a�er Blatt: disabil­
ity rights protection for transgender people who experience stigma and bias as­
sociated with gender dysphoria, including a lack of access to appropriate bath­
rooms for transgender students,15 refusal of proper uniforms to transgender
workers,16 denial of access to proper medical care and gender-appropriate facil­
ities and programs to transgender prisoners,17 and threats of exclusion of
transgender patrons from private business establishments.18 
13. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123.
14. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451­
53 (5th ed. 2013) [hereina�er DSM-5].
15. See, e.g., Gavin Grimm, Opinion, Gavin Grimm: The Fight for Transgender Rights Is Bigger
Than Me, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/opinion/gavin
-grimm-the-fight-for-transgender-rights-is-bigger-than-me.html [http://perma.cc/824E
-G57Z] (discussing the school’s refusal to permit transgender student to use gender-
appropriate bathrooms).
16. See, e.g., Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, A Landmark Victory for Trans Rights—Under the Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act, SLATE (May 24, 2017, 12:27 PM) http://www.slate.com/blogs 
/outward/2017/05/24/a_landmark_victory_for_trans_rights_under_the_ada.html [http:// 
perma.cc/3EK3-GJTD] (discussing a lawsuit challenging, inter alia, employer’s refusal to 
provide transgender employee with gender-appropriate uniform).
17. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing a lawsuit brought by formerly incarcer­
ated transgender woman challenging, inter alia, solitary confinement in a gender-
inappropriate facility, incorrect name and pronoun usage, and denial of access to gender-
appropriate programs, clothing, and accessories).
18. See, e.g., Eliott C. McLaughlin, North Carolina’s HB142: Repeal? Compromise? What Does It
All Mean?, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/us/north-carolina-hb2
-repeal-hb142-explainer [http://perma.cc/6W92-NLUJ] (discussing North Carolina’s 
House Bill 2 and its replacement law, HB 142, which, among other things, prohibit local 
governments from protecting transgender people from discrimination in public accommo­
dations).
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blatt v. cabela's retail, inc. and a new path for transgender rights
i . sex and disability
As clarified by the 2008 amendments to the ADA,19 the statutory definition
of disability is extremely broad and, frankly, a misnomer. The word “disability”
is commonly associated with medical conditions that disrupt a person’s ability
to function—that incapacitate.20 Indeed, that is exactly how “disability” is de­
fined in the Social Security Act, which provides cash benefits to people with
medical conditions who cannot work because of those conditions.21 Under the
ADA, however, disability means something very different. A person is covered
by this law if the person is discriminated against based on a real or perceived
medical condition—regardless of how limiting that condition may be.22 A per­
son is also covered if the person has or once had a medical condition that
would, in the absence of treatment, be substantially limiting.23 
To illustrate the breadth of the ADA’s coverage, consider a person who suc­
cessfully manages depression with medication and talk therapy, a person with
epilepsy who has been seizure-free for decades, a person with diabetes who
takes insulin, a person with an anxiety disorder who avoids certain social situa­
tions, and a person undergoing surgery for a back injury. They are all covered
by the ADA regardless of how or whether their medical condition actually in­
terferes with activities of daily living.24 
19. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553.
20. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 140
(2000) (“In the area of disability, the instinctive understanding displayed by most courts is
that ‘disability’ is synonymous with ‘inability to work or function,’ and that people with dis­
abilities are significantly different from the norm.”).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘disability’ means . . . inability to en­
gage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being regard­
ed as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been sub­
jected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical 
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major
life activity.”).
23. See id. §§ 12102(1), (4)(E)(i) (stating that “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities of such individual” and “(B) a record of such an impairment,” and that “[t]he
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures”).
24. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2016) (“[I]t should easily be concluded that the following types of
impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicat­
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According to his complaint, Gavin Grimm was “diagnosed by medical pro­
fessionals as having Gender Dysphoria, which is a serious medical condition
characterized by clinically significant distress caused by an incongruence be­
tween a person’s gender identity and the person’s assigned sex at birth.”25 Le�
untreated, gender dysphoria can result in debilitating depression, anxiety, and,
for some people, suicidality and death.26 As part of his medically-supervised 
treatment for gender dysphoria, Grimm underwent hormone therapy, legally
changed his name, and lived “as a boy in all aspects of his life,” including, natu­
rally, using the boys’ restroom.27 
Though not pleaded in Grimm’s complaint, the ADA might have provided
a source of relief separate from Title IX. Under the ADA, Grimm could have al­
leged that the school board’s policy denied him equal access to benefits provid­
ed to his peers who did not have gender dysphoria—namely, the ability to use
the boys’ restroom.28 He might also have alleged that the policy had a discrimi­
natory effect on boys with gender dysphoria, singling them out by requiring
ed: . . . diabetes substantially limits endocrine function; epilepsy substantially limits
neurological function; . . . and major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia substantially
limit brain function.”); Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 573-74 (4th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the plaintiff ’s social anxiety disorder was a disability under the
ADA, even though the plaintiff “interact[ed] with others on a daily basis, routinely an­
swered inquiries from the public at the front counter, socialized with her co-workers outside
of work, and engaged in social interaction on Facebook” (internal quotation marks omit­
ted)); Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the plaintiff ’s back injury was a disability under the ADA when considered
without regard to the ameliorative effects of back surgery).
25. Complaint at 1, ¶ 1, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D.
Va. 2015) (No. 4:14-CV-00054-RGD-TEM) [hereina�er G.G. Complaint].
26. See DSM-5, supra note 14, at 454-55; Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & De­
fenders et al. in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 7, Blatt v. Cabela’s
Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-4822-JFL, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2015) [hereina�er
Blatt Amicus Brief].
27. G.G. Complaint, supra note 25, ¶¶ 2, 26.
28. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)-(ii), (b)(1)(iv), (d) (2016) (prohibiting “[d]eny[ing] a
qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the 
aid, benefit, or service”; “afford[ing] a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity
to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded
others”; “[p]rovid[ing] different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals with
disabilities or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others”; and
failing to “administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting ap­
propriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities”).
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blatt v. cabela's retail, inc. and a new path for transgender rights
that they—and no one else—use a separate, non-student-use restroom.29 Lastly,
he might have argued that the school had a duty to modify its restroom policy
to ensure that transgender boys can use the boys’ restroom and that such a
modification would not “fundamentally alter” the educational services provid­
ed by the school.30 
Gavin Grimm likely did not allege discrimination under the ADA for a sim­
ple reason: the ADA explicitly excludes “transvestism, transsexual­
ism . . . [and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical im­
pairments.”31 The legislative history of the ADA reveals that these three
conditions were excluded due to congressional moral opprobrium, including
and especially that of two conservative senior senators, William Armstrong (R­
CO) and Jesse Helms (R-NC).32 In support of his proposed amendment ex­
29. See id. § 35.130(b)(3), (b)(3)(i), (b)(8) (prohibiting a public entity from “utiliz[ing] crite­
ria or methods of administration . . . that have the effect of subjecting qualified individu­
als with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability,” and “apply[ing] eligibility
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of in­
dividuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activi­
ty”).
30. See id. § 35.130(b)(7) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012). Like Gavin Grimm, the plaintiff in Whitaker, a transgender
boy “diagnosed . . . with Gender Dysphoria,” brought claims against his school district 
under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause—but not under the ADA. Whitaker v. Ke­
nosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034, 1040 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district court’s
preliminary injunction against the school district).
32. See Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People, 
16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 13-25 (2013) (discussing the legislative history of the
ADA). For several foundational articles discussing the legislative history behind the ADA ex­
clusions, see Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Re­
habilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-42 (Christine Michelle Duffy et al. eds., 2014);
Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire To Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection
Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 526-40 (2016); Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 33, 44-46, 49-50 (2004). See also
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Sec-
ond-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 519 (1991) (“No evi­
dence suggests that Congress investigated such conditions, except, perhaps, for the problem
of illegal drug use. Consequently, it is arguable that the members of Congress relied upon
nothing other than their own negative reactions, fears and prejudices in fashioning the list
of excluded classes.”); L. Camille Hebert, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 535, 540 (2009) (stating that the amendment excluding
transgender-related conditions “appears to have been motivated by an attempt to appease
conservative members of Congress who saw the ADA as favoring individuals whose ‘life­
379






     
     
   
     
  
 
    
 





     
        
 
      
  
     
   
   
  





    




    
    
    
  
     
  
 
the yale law journal forum October 12, 2017
cluding gender identity disorder and several other stigmatized medical condi­
tions33 from the ADA, Armstrong expressed concern with “provid[ing] a pro­
tected legal status to somebody who has such disorders, particularly those who
might have a moral content to them or which in the opinion of some people
have a moral content.”34 Helms likewise decried the ADA’s curtailment of an
employer’s right to make judgments about employees based on the employer’s
“own moral standards”35:
If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair or those who have
been injured in the war, that is one thing. But how in the world did you
get to the place that you did not even [ex]clude transves­
tites? . . . What I get out of all of this is here comes the U.S. Gov­
ernment telling the employer that he cannot set up any moral standards
for his business . . . . [H]e cannot say, look I feel very strongly about
people who engage in sexually deviant behavior or unlawful sexual
practices.36 
styles’ they did not approve of at the expense of those with religiously-motivated reasons for
not wanting to hire those persons”); Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal
Responses to Health Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88,
117-18, 122-23 (2002) (discussing the legislative history of the ADA’s transgender exclu­
sions).
33. In addition to “transvestism, transsexualism, . . . [and] gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments,” the ADA excludes the following medical conditions
from its definition of disability: “pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism . . . or other sex­
ual behavior disorders”; “compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania”; and “psycho­
active substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12211(b) (2012).
34. 135 CONG. REC. 19,853 (1989); see also 135 CONG. REC. 19,896 (1989) (statement of Sen.
Rudman) (“[A] diagnosis of certain types of mental illness is frequently made on the basis
of a pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks any physiological basis. In short, we
are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and which individuals are
engaging in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not fully under­
stand . . . . [P]eople must bear some responsibility for the consequences of their own ac­
tions.”); Barry et al., supra note 32, at 574-76 (stating that “[i]n addition to the direct evi­
dence of moral animus in the ADA’s legislative history, indirect evidence of moral animus
abounds in the structure of the transgender exclusions” and the “practical effect” of such ex­
clusions).
35. 135 CONG. REC. 19,864 (1989).
36. Id. Significantly, this was not the first time that Senator Helms attempted to exclude
transgender people from a civil rights law. In support of his opposition to the 1987 Civil
Rights Restoration Act, he posed this question:
[D]o we really want private institutions, particularly schools and day care centers
to be prohibited from refusing to hire a transvestite because some Federal court
380
          
 
 
   
      
         
   
   
     
       
 
        
          
   






   
 
        
    
   
    
      
  
   
  
     
 
   
 
  
      
   
    
   
    
blatt v. cabela's retail, inc. and a new path for transgender rights
For well over twenty-five years, the Armstrong-Helms amendment effectively
closed the door to ADA protections for transgender people, who eschewed dis­
ability rights law in favor of sex discrimination protections.
i i . 	  blatt v. cabela’s retail, inc. and the importance of ada 
coverage of gender dysphoria
Although Gavin Grimm understandably did not challenge his discrimina­
tion under the ADA, other transgender litigants have done so despite the ADA’s
transgender exclusions.37 In 2014, a transgender woman named Kate Lynn
Blatt, who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, experienced discrimination
while working at Cabela’s Retail, a private sporting goods store.38 She was re­
quired to wear a nametag bearing the name “James” until she provided docu­
mentation that her name and gender marker had been legally changed.39 She
was required to work in a secluded part of the store.40 She was subjected to
harassment by other employees who called her a host of derogatory names, in­
cluding “ladyboy,” “he/she,” “sinner,” “fag,” and “freak.”41 And she was prohib­
ited from using the female bathroom. A�er initially suggesting that she use the 
may find that this violates the transvestite’s civil rights to wear a dress and to wear
foam, that sort of thing? Do we really want to prohibit these private institutions
from making employment decisions based on moral qualifications?
Barry et al., supra note 32, at 528 (citing 134 CONG. REC. 4235 (1988)).
And in 1988, Helms proposed an amendment to the Fair Housing Amendments Act to ex­
clude “transvestites” both from the Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The
amendment passed. See Duffy, supra note 32, at 16-32 (discussing Helms’s exclusion of
“transvestites” from the Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act). According to Helms, the 
exclusion amounted to “a little common sense . . . . [I]t should be clear to the courts that
Congress does not intend for transvestites to receive the benefits and protections that is [sic]
provided for handicapped individuals.” Barry et al., supra note 32, at 529 (citing 134 CONG.
REC. 19,711-51 (1988)).
37. See infra notes 38-45, 83-84, 87 and accompanying text (discussing three cases challenging
gender dysphoria discrimination).
38. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18,
2017).
39. Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff ’s First Amended Complaint at 4, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2015)
(No. 5:14-CV-04822) [hereina�er Blatt Mem. Opp].
40. Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 23-24, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2014) (No. 
5:14-CV-04822) [hereina�er Blatt Complaint].
41.	 Blatt Mem. Opp., supra note 39, at 5.
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restroom at a Dunkin’ Donuts across the street, her employer eventually al­
lowed her to use the single-sex “family” restroom at the front of the store.42 
In 2014, Blatt sued in federal district court in the Eastern District of Penn­
sylvania, alleging discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and the ADA.43 When Cabela’s moved to dismiss the ADA claim based on the
ADA’s transgender exclusions, Blatt did something that no litigant had ever
done before—she argued that the exclusions violate the Equal Protection
Clause.44 Driven by “a bare congressional desire to harm” transgender people,
Blatt alleged, Congress excluded from the ADA medical conditions closely as­
sociated with such people.45 In so doing, Congress deprived transgender people
of the unique protections of the ADA (namely, reasonable accommodations)
and also stigmatized them as unworthy of civil rights protections.46 
In an amicus brief, six state and national transgender rights organizations
advanced a separate, statutory argument: the ADA’s exclusion of “gender iden­
tity disorders” does not apply to gender dysphoria, which is a distinct diagnosis
with physical roots—not a disorder of identity.47 Therefore, amici argued, gen­
der dysphoria is not the equivalent of gender identity disorder as Congress un­
derstood it in 1992 or any of the other related conditions excluded from the
ADA.
Shortly a�er this amicus brief was filed, the U.S. Department of Justice un­
der Attorney General Loretta Lynch filed a Statement of Interest that reached
the same result as amici, although by slightly different means. Gender dyspho­
42. Id. at 6.
43. Blatt Complaint, supra note 40, at ¶ 1–2.
44. Blatt Mem. Opp., supra note 39, at 2-3.
45. Id. at 2 (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
46. See id. at 3 (“[T]he ADA isolates, segregates, and injures those transgender individuals that
the ADA should protect.”); cf. Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Law in Response to This Court’s
Order Dated July 28, 2015 at 8-9, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-4822-JFL, 2017
WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2015) (discussing the ADA’s “unique” reasonable accommoda­
tion mandate, which is not shared by Title VII). In their amicus brief, six state and national
transgender rights organizations echoed these twin themes, arguing that removal of the 
ADA’s transgender exclusions “would provide sorely needed, comprehensive antidiscrimina­
tion protection to transgender people” and “would also eliminate a source of blatant, legally-
sanctioned prejudice against them.” Blatt Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 3.
47. Blatt Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 12-15 (arguing that gender dysphoria differs from gen­
der identity disorders based on its name, diagnostic criteria, organization within the DSM,
and recent scientific studies strongly suggesting that physical conditions—hormonal and
possibly genetic—contribute to gender incongruence and thus, gender dysphoria). Although
amici explicitly agreed with Blatt’s constitutional argument, id. at 2 n.7, the amicus brief ad­
vanced a statutory argument as an alternative to deciding the constitutional question.
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ria is not distinct from gender identity disorder, DOJ argued, but emerging sci­
ence indicates that gender dysphoria results not from a mental impairment but
rather from a physical one (i.e., neurological, genetic, and/or hormonal
sources).48 Therefore, DOJ argued, gender dysphoria is not excluded from the 
ADA based on the terms of the statute—i.e., gender dysphoria is a gender iden­
tity disorder resulting from a physical impairment.49 
For two years, the parties waited. Finally, on May 18, 2017, the court issued
a remarkable decision denying Cabela’s motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim.50 
The decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, and most obviously, the de­
cision is the first to hold that gender dysphoria is not an excluded condition
under the ADA. Second, the court employed novel analysis to reach this histor­
ic result.
Like amici, the court found that “gender identity disorders” are not the
same as “gender dysphoria” and, therefore, gender dysphoria is not excluded
from the ADA.51 But, unlike amici, the court did not base its decision on the
fact that “gender identity disorders” constitute a different, outdated medical di­
agnosis. Instead, the court concluded that the ADA’s transgender-related exclu­
sions do not encompass any medical conditions associated with being
transgender.52 
According to the court, the ADA excludes “two distinct categories” of con­
ditions from its definition of disability: “first, non-disabling conditions that
concern sexual orientation or identity,” such as “homosexuality” and “bisexuali­
ty”; and “second, disabling conditions that are associated with harmful or ille­
48. Second Statement, supra note 12, at 3-6. Significantly, the Department of Justice under At­
torney General Jeff Sessions has adhered to this position. See infra note 86 and accompany­
ing text (discussing the DOJ’s Statement of Interest in Doe v. Arrisi).
49. Compare Second Statement, supra note 12, at 3, with 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (excluding “gen­
der identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments”) (emphasis added).
50. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 (“[Gender dysphoria] is not excluded by § 12211 of the ADA,
and Cabela’s motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claims on this basis is denied.”).
51. See id. at *2 (interpreting “the term gender identity disorders [as used in the
ADA] . . . narrowly to refer to only the condition of identifying with a different gender,
not to encompass (and therefore exclude from ADA protection) a condition like Blatt’s gen­
der dysphoria”).
52. See id. at *2 & n.1 (concluding that the term “gender identity disorders” as used in the ADA
does not “align[] with the term’s definition in the revised third edition of the American Psy­
chiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,” nor does the term
refer to “a condition like Blatt’s gender dysphoria, which goes beyond merely identifying
with a different gender and is characterized by clinically significant stress and other impair­
ments that may be disabling”).
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gal conduct,” such as pedophilia, pyromania, and kleptomania.53 “Gender iden­
tity disorders,” the court reasoned, fall into the first category. “[G]ender identi­
ty disorders,” as used in the ADA, “refer to only the condition of identifying
with a different gender”—i.e., being transgender.54 Like being gay, lesbian, or
bisexual, the court reasoned, being transgender is, by itself, not a medical con­
dition and is therefore not a disability under the ADA.55 
Gender dysphoria, by contrast, is a medical condition. “[A] condition like
Blatt’s gender dysphoria,” the court concluded, “goes beyond merely identify­
ing with a different gender and is characterized by clinically significant stress
and other impairments that may be disabling . . . . [Specifically, gender
dysphoria] substantially limits her major life activities of interacting with oth­
ers, reproducing, and social and occupational functioning.”56 Because gender
dysphoria has medically significant clinical features, it does not fall into the
first category of exclusions with sexual orientation and transgender identity.57 
In addition, because gender dysphoria is “not associated with harmful or illegal
conduct,” it does not fall into the second category either.58 Accordingly, Blatt’s
condition “is not excluded by . . . the ADA.”59 
Interpreting the ADA to exclude gender dysphoria, the court concluded,
would have been inconsistent with the ADA’s text by “exclud[ing] from the
ADA conditions that are actually disabling but that are not associated with
harmful or illegal conduct.”60 Such an interpretation would also have been in­
consistent with the ADA’s remedial purpose as indicated by its legislative histo­
53. Id. at *3 & n.2.
54. Id. at *2; see id. at *4 (“[I]it is fairly possible to interpret the term gender identity disorders
narrowly to refer to simply the condition of identifying with a different gender . . . .”). 
55. See id. at *3 (stating that “the term gender identity disorders . . . belong[s] to the first
category described above,” i.e., “non-disabling conditions that concern sexual orientation or
identity”). The Blatt court’s reasoning is supported by the American Psychiatric Association’s 
history of pathologizing both gay identity (by labeling same-sex orientation a disorder until
1973) and transgender identity (by labeling gender incongruence a disorder until 2013). See
Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 276-77 (2006) (discussing the
APA’s diagnoses of “homosexuality” and “gender identity disorder”). As the court suggests,
Congress may well have intended for the ADA to exclude only pathologized identities—not 
the medical conditions that people with those identities may have.
56. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2, *4.
57. Id. at *3-4 (distinguishing the ADA’s exclusion of “non-disabling conditions that concern
sexual orientation or identity” from the ADA’s inclusion of “disabling conditions that per­
sons who identify with a different gender may have—such as Blatt’s gender dysphoria”).
58. Id. at *3.
59. Id. at *4.
60. Id. at *3.
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ry, “which reveal[ed] that Congress was careful to distinguish between exclud­
ing certain sexual identities from the ADA’s definition of disability, on one
hand, and not excluding disabling conditions that persons of those identities
might have, on the other hand.”61 Indeed, Congress “specifically rejected
amendments” that would have prevented “a person who is gay from receiving
coverage under the statute if the person had a disability,” such as HIV/AIDS.62 
So, too, with gender identity disorders: Congress did not intend to prevent
people who “identify[] with a different gender,” i.e., transgender individuals,
from receiving coverage under the statute if the person has a medical condition
like gender dysphoria.63 
In sum, the court in Blatt recognized two discrete but sometimes related
experiences—one of being transgender, the other of having gender dysphoria.
Being transgender is, standing alone, akin to being gay or lesbian; it is not a
medical condition and, therefore, does not by itself bring a person under the
ADA’s protections.64 Gender dysphoria, however, is distinct; it is a quintessen­
tially stigmatized medical condition characterized by clinically significant dis­
tress associated with being transgender.65 Importantly, the court recognized
that no principled reason exists for excluding transgender people who experi­
ence a medical condition associated with that identity from securing protec­
tions under the ADA.66 
The court’s decision is consistent with contemporary medical standards and
represents a major step forward for transgender people. While not all 
transgender people experience clinically significant distress, the fact that many
61. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at *3 n.3 (quoting H.R. Rep. 101-485, at 76 (1990)).
63. Id. at *4. According to the Blatt court, interpreting the ADA to exclude gender dysphoria
would also have been inconsistent with the constitutional avoidance canon of statutory con­
struction. Because the court’s interpretation “allow[ed] the Court to avoid the constitutional 
questions raised in this case”—i.e., that the exclusion of gender identity disorders violates
equal protection—“it [wa]s the Court’s duty to adopt it.” Id.
64. See Barry & Levi, supra note 16.
65. See Breakthrough for Trans Civil Rights Protections, GLAD (May 19, 2017), http://www.glad 
.org/post/breakthrough-trans-civil-rights-protections [http://perma.cc/247W-W2QQ].
66. See id; see also Patrick Dorrian, Disability Bias Ruling for Transgender Worker: Boon or Blip?, 
BLOOMBERG LAB. & EMPL. (BNA) (June 1, 2017) (“‘When viewed through the prism of disa­
bility, judges have less difficulty seeing that the cure’ for gender dysphoria is allowing gen­
der-diverse and gender-affirmed people to express themselves through which bathroom
they use, how they dress, and how they otherwise present themselves to the public and at
work . . . . [Disability law] also helps judges ‘understand the underlying medical condi­
tion [of gender dysphoria] and that trans people are normal.’” (quoting Christine Duffy,
Senior Staff Attorney, Pro Bono Partnership)).
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do should not be ignored—particularly by our civil rights laws.67 The Blatt de­
cision goes a long way in recognizing this, righting a decades-long wrong that
deprived transgender people of the opportunity to challenge bias and stigma
associated with a medical condition.
The strategy of pursuing disability protections for transgender people has
received criticism from some transgender rights advocates.68 Challenges to this
approach come in two basic varieties. The first is that, by recognizing gender
dysphoria as a medical condition, ADA claims pursued by transgender litigants
legitimate the pathologization of transgender identity. This concern ignores the
distinction between transgender identity and gender dysphoria. Transgender
identity is not a medical condition.69 Gender dysphoria, on the other hand, is a 
medical condition; it is real, serious, and physically incapacitating, and o�en
can only be ameliorated by medical care.70 It is also a highly stigmatized medical
67. See Blatt Amicus Brief, supra note 26, at 18 (stating that, “[b]y maintaining th[e] exclusion”
of gender dysphoria, “the ADA perpetuates the very thing it seeks to dismantle: the preju­
diced attitudes or ignorance of others and the inferior status that people with disabilities oc­
cupy in our society” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. See, e.g., Jeannie J. Chung, Identity or Condition?: The Theory and Practice of Applying State
Disability Laws to Transgender Individuals, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 35-36 (2011); Hébert,
supra note 32, at 542-43; S. Elizabeth Malloy, What Best To Protect Transsexuals from Discrimi­
nation: Using Current Legislation or Adopting a New Judicial Framework, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 283, 316 (2011); Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 35 (2003). For articles supporting disability rights protection for medical
conditions associated with transgender people, see, for example, Katie Aber, When Anti-
Discrimination Law Discriminates: A Right to Transgender Dignity in Disability Law, 50 COLUM.
J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 301 (2017); Barry, supra note 32, at 34-49; Colker, supra note 32, at
34, 50; Duffy, supra note 32, at 16-9 to -10; Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act as Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1479 (1994); Hong, supra
note 32, at 93-94; Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender
People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-83 (Paisley Currah et al. eds.,
2006); Zach Strassburger, Disability Law and the Disability Rights Movement for Transpeople, 
24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 337, 338 (2012).
69. Compare DSM-5, supra note 14, at 458 (“Gender dysphoria should be distinguished from
simple nonconformity to stereotypical gender role behavior by the strong desire to be of an­
other gender than the assigned one and by the extent and pervasiveness of gender-variant
activities and interests.”), with id. at 452 (“The condition is associated with clinically signifi­
cant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of function­
ing.”), and id. at 453 (stating that, in addition to marked incongruence, “[t]here must also be
evidence of distress about this incongruence”).
70. See DSM-5, supra note 14, at 451 (“Although not all [transgender] individuals will experience
distress as a result of [gender] incongruence, many are distressed if the desired physical in­
terventions by means of hormones and/or surgery are not available.”); id. at 454 (“Adoles­
cents and adults with gender dysphoria before gender reassignment are at increased risk for
suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and suicides. A�er gender reassignment, adjustment may
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condition that engenders fear and discomfort in others—the very type of condi­
tion that Congress had in mind when it passed the ADA.71 Because the ADA
was intended to redress prejudice associated with stigmatized medical condi­
tions, people who experience such prejudice ought to pursue these protections,
not avoid them.
The second concern is that, unlike sex discrimination law, ADA coverage of
gender dysphoria might brand transgender people as incapable of functioning.
This concern misunderstands disability rights law. The ADA has always em­
bodied the “social model” of disability: the idea that negative reactions to med­
ical conditions—not the conditions themselves—“disable.”72 For nearly twenty
years, the Supreme Court effectively ignored the social model, articulating in­
stead a “medical model” of disability: the idea that disability results from se­
verely limiting medical conditions.73 But in 2008, with tremendous bipartisan
support, Congress amended the ADA to clarify its original intent that “disabil­
ity” should be broadly construed to protect virtually everyone who experiences
discrimination based on a medical condition—real or perceived, functionally
vary, and suicide risk may persist.”); see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER
HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE 5 (7th ed., 2012), http://admin.associationsonline.com 
/uploaded_files/140/files/Standards%20of%20Care,%20V7%20Full%20Book.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/EV78-4W43] (“Gender dysphoria can in large part be alleviated through treat­
ment.”).
71. See Levi & Klein, supra note 68, at 88-89; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012) (finding
that “society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities”); id.
§ 12101(a)(6) (finding that “people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status
in our society”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 3, at 30-31 (discussing ADA coverage of “a per­
son who is rejected from a job because of the myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with
disabilities”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
437, 445 (2000) (stating that the ADA protects those whose impairments are “stigmatized,”
that is, those who “differ too much from a socially defined ‘norm,’” such that they are con­
sidered “abnormal or defective in mind or body”); cf. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (stating that “the basic purpose” of ADA’s predecessor, Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, “is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or
other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others,” and stating
that “society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment”).
72. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 18-20 (2009) (discussing the social model of disability); Kevin Barry, Toward 
Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 211-12 (2010) (same).
73. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 18-20 (discussing the medical model of disability); Barry,
supra note 72, at 210-11 (same).
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limiting or not.74 As a result, many treatable medical conditions that would be 
functionally limiting in the absence of such treatment—including epilepsy, dia­
betes, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disor­
der, and obsessive compulsive disorder—are now presumed to be disabilities
under the amended law.75 Add to this the ADA’s coverage of minor medical
conditions that are not typically thought of as “disabilities,” such as skin gra�
scars, and it is clear that ADA coverage is not tied to an inability to function.76 
Given the breadth of the ADA’s definition of disability, there is no reason to
resist categorizing gender dysphoria as a disability. Indeed, the continued ex­
clusion of gender dysphoria, along with eight conditions that involve “harmful
or illegal conduct,”77 is more likely to exacerbate—not reduce—the stigma asso­
74. See Barry, supra note 72, at 278 (discussing “nearly universal nondiscrimination protection
under the ‘regarded as’ prong” of the ADA’s definition of disability and reasonable accom­
modation protection for a “vastly expanded” class of people); Michelle A. Travis, Impairment
as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 952-55 (2012).
75. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)-(iii) (2016) (listing impairments that, “[g]iven their
inherent nature . . . will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a sub­
stantial limitation on a major life activity,” and including “au­
tism . . . diabetes . . . epilepsy . . . major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, [and] obsessive compulsive disorder”); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.108(d)(2)(iii)(E)-(K) (2016) (discussing “[p]redictable assessments” of disability).
76. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630 app. (2012) (“[I]f an employer refused to hire an applicant because of skin gra�
scars, the employer has regarded the applicant as an individual with a disability.”); see also
Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing
on S. 1881 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Chai R. Feldblum, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center)
(“This [hearing] room is filled with people with disabilities who want Congress to pass [the
ADA Amendments Act]. They don’t believe this bill sets back their cause. Why not? Because 
they understand there is no set of ‘truly disabled’ people and then all the rest of us. We all
exist along a spectrum of abilities. It is true that many of us might never experience discrim­
ination because of our physical or mental impairments, while others of us may experience
significant discrimination. But that is not because some of us are truly disabled and others
are not. It is because of the type of discrimination that some of us will suffer, and others of
us will not. There is no ‘us’ and ‘them.’”); Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended?, 
17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 27-31 (2013) (listing a broad range of impairments that
courts have found to be disabilities under the amended law); Cass R. Sunstein, Caste and
Disability: The Moral Foundations of the ADA, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 21, 26 (2008)
(responding to Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839 (2008)
by arguing that there is no “sharp dichotomy” between “those who are able and those who
are not . . . . [T]here is a continuum here . . . . [T]he purpose of the ADA, rightly
conceived, is to break down distinctions that have their current force only because of social
practices that have been so taken for granted that they are o�en unseen as practices at all.”).
77. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 18,
2017).
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ciated with gender dysphoria. For these reasons, and notwithstanding well-
intentioned concerns, the overwhelming consensus among transgender rights
advocates is strongly in favor of ADA coverage of gender dysphoria.78 
i i i . a new path: gender dysphoria discrimination
Blatt marks the beginning of a new way forward toward securing legal pro­
tections for transgender people through disability rights law.79 Transgender lit­
igants who have gender dysphoria, who once had gender dysphoria and have
successfully treated it (for example, by living part time or full time in their de­
sired gender role, undergoing hormone therapy, having surgery, or some com­
bination), or who are erroneously perceived as having gender dysphoria (i.e.,
those who do not experience distress but who are transgender)—might now
consider bringing ADA claims.80 
The ADA, with its distinct structure and scope, is well-suited to combat
discrimination against transgender people who have, had, or are perceived as
78. See, e.g., Brief for Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposi­
tion to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at vii-xii, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-CV-08640 (D.N.J.
Feb. 24, 2017) (arguing in support of ADA coverage of Gender Dysphoria on behalf of: Bay
Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Gender Jus­
tice, Intersex & Genderqueer Recognition Project, The LGBT Bar Association of New York,
National Center for Lesbian Rights, The National Center for Transgender Equality, National
LGBTQ Bar, National LGBTQ Task Force, Transgender Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Trans United, and Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc.); see also supra note 68 and accompanying
text (discussing the debate surrounding disability rights protections for medical conditions
associated with transgender people).
79. See, e.g., Dorrian, supra note 66 (stating that Blatt “should be a further signal to corporate
America that ‘a tipping point has come’ in the march toward LGBT workplace rights” (quot­
ing Christine Duffy, Senior Staff Attorney, Pro Bono Partnership)); Barry & Levi, supra note 
64 (“The seeds of prejudice in the ADA have sown the future of transgender rights advoca­
cy.”). In the eloquent words of Senior Judge Andre Davis, Blatt’s case, like Gavin Grimm’s,
“is part of a larger movement that is redefining and broadening the scope of civil and human
rights so that they extend to a vulnerable group that has traditionally been unrecognized,
unrepresented, and unprotected.” G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 853 F.3d
729, 730 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, J., concurring in order vacating preliminary injunction). By
challenging the ADA’s transgender exclusions, Blatt rightly stands with “brave individuals— 
Dred Scott, Fred Korematsu, Linda Brown, Mildred and Richard Loving, Edie Windsor, and
Jim Obergefell, to name just a few—who refused to accept quietly the injustices that were
perpetuated against them.” Id.
80. Compare, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 (holding that the ADA does not exclude gender dys­
phoria from definition of disability), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), (3) (2012) (defining disa­
bility to include past or present substantially limiting impairments, as well as adverse treat­
ment based on any impairment—real or perceived, limiting or not).
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having gender dysphoria, for two reasons. First, unlike sex discrimination law,
the ADA defines discrimination to include not only disparate treatment and
disparate impact, but also the failure to provide “reasonable accommodations”
in the workplace and to “reasonably modify” discriminatory policies, such as
those governing restroom usage, dressing, and grooming standards.81 Second,
unlike Title VII and Title IX, the ADA is comprehensive; its legal protections
extend beyond employment and education to public accommodations and state
and local government benefits and services.82 
Accordingly, in addition to challenging employment discrimination under
the ADA, as Blatt did, transgender litigants may consider challenging gender
dysphoria discrimination in a range of other contexts. For example, in Novem­
ber 2016, in Doe v. Arrisi, a woman with gender dysphoria sued the state of
New Jersey in federal district court over a state law—shared by a majority of
states—that requires proof of gender confirmation surgery in order to change
the gender marker on one’s birth certificate.83 Requiring a person with gender
dysphoria to undergo medical treatment that is unnecessary, medically contra­
indicated, or too costly, she argues, not only violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses but also constitutes disability discrimination under the
ADA.84 Significantly, a�er New Jersey invoked the ADA exclusion as grounds
for dismissing the plaintiff ’s ADA claim,85 the Department of Justice under At­
torney General Jeff Sessions filed a Statement of Interest supporting ADA cover­
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (reasonable accommodations in employment); id.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (reasonable modifications in public accommodations); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i) (reasonable modifications in government benefits and services).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (prohibiting disability discrimination in employment, state and
local government benefits and services, and public accommodations). By contrast, there is
no federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in either public accommodations or gov­
ernment benefits and services. Titles II and VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibit discrimina­
tion in public accommodations and federally-funded government programs and activities,
respectively, based on “race, color, religion, or national origin”—not sex. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (Title II); id. § 2000d (Title VI).
83. Complaint ¶¶ 2-3, 10, Arrisi, No. 3:16-CV-08640 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2016) [hereina�er Arrisi
Complaint]; see also Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State
Guidelines, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans
-changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations [http://perma.cc/N83T-PV4Q] (compiling
state laws regarding changing gender marker on birth certificates).
84. Arrisi Complaint, supra note 83, at ¶¶ 45-49.
85. Brief for Defendants in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 27, Arrisi, No. 3:16-CV­
08640 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2016) (invoking the ADA exclusion).
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age for gender dysphoria and reiterating its position in Blatt that gender dys­
phoria that results from a physical impairment is not excluded by the ADA.86 
Transgender litigants may also consider bringing ADA claims to challenge:
(1) state prison policies that deny transgender prisoners access to proper medi­
cal care and gender-appropriate facilities and programs, as a formerly incarcer­
ated transgender woman in Connecticut has done;87 (2) laws like North Caro­
lina’s H.B. 288 as well as the actions of private businesses, which deny people
with gender dysphoria access to gender-appropriate facilities, including bath-
rooms;89 and (3) policies like those at issue in G.G. that deny people with gen­
der dysphoria access to gender-appropriate facilities and other services in pub­
lic and private schools.90 
In addition to the ADA, transgender litigants may consider invoking the
protections of two other federal disability rights statutes that contain
86. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2-3, Arrisi, No. 3:16-CV-08640 (D.N.J. July 17,
2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1)) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff has alleged that her GD result­
ed from a ‘physical impairment,’ . . . by definition she has alleged that she falls within the 
statutory protections of the ADA.”). Twelve transgender rights and transgender health or­
ganizations have filed an amicus brief in support of the Plaintiff that addresses the statutory
and equal protection arguments in favor of ADA protection for gender dysphoria. See Bay
Area Lawyers Amici, supra note 78, at 2-3.
87. In November 2016, in Doe v. Dzurenda, a young woman with Gender Dysphoria sued the
state of Connecticut in federal district court for, among other things, placing her in solitary
confinement in a gender-inappropriate facility, denying her the ability to participate in pro­
grams with peer groups that aligned with her gender identity, using the wrong name and
pronoun when referring to her, and prohibiting her from wearing gender-appropriate cloth­
ing and accessories. These actions, she alleges, violated not only the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause, but also the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and other federal statutes that
protect prisoners. See Complaint, ¶¶ 122-222, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-CV-01934 (D.
Conn. Nov. 23, 2016) [hereina�er Dzurenda Complaint]. The State of Connecticut has in­
voked the ADA exclusion. Defendants’ Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss at
41-43, Dzurenda, No. 3:16-CV-01934 (D. Conn. May 1, 2017).
88. See Richard Fausset, Bathroom Law Repeal Leaves Few Pleased in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/north-carolina-senate-acts-to
-repeal-restrictive-bathroom-law.html [http://perma.cc/JZX6-C8HH] (discussing North
Carolina’s House Bill 2, which “restricted the ability of municipalities to enact anti-
discrimination policies and required transgender people in government and public buildings
to use the bathroom that corresponds with the gender on their birth certificate”).
89. See Transgender People and Access to Public Accommodations, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY (Sept. 2014), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/kyr/Public 
Accommodations_September2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/GS9S-YVX3] (discussing the 
“patchwork of state and local laws” prohibiting discrimination against transgender people in
public accommodations and the lack of federal law prohibiting such discrimination).
90. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the public school’s refusal to permit
Gavin Grimm to use gender-appropriate bathroom).
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transgender exclusions: the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits disabil­
ity discrimination by federal agencies and recipients of federal funds, and the
Fair Housing Act, which prohibits disability discrimination in housing sales,
rentals, and financing.91 Because the Rehabilitation Act excludes from its defi­
nition of “disability” the same conditions as the ADA,92 the interpretation of
the latter by the Blatt court, Blatt amici, and the Trump Administration itself
should apply with equal force to the former. Gender dysphoria is therefore not
excluded from the protection of the Rehabilitation Act.93 This means that ad­
verse action taken against transgender people by federal agencies and recipients
of federal funds (including state agencies that receive federal funding) may
well constitute disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.94 
91.	 Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(F)(i), 794 et seq. (2012) (prohibiting federal agencies and
recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on disability, and excluding, inter alia, 
“transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments”
from definition of disability), with 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2012) (prohibiting housing pro­
viders and lending institutions from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, na­
tional origin, familial status, or disability, and excluding “transvestites” from definition of 
disability through a statutory note to § 3602). Because the Fair Housing Act prohibits dis­
crimination based on sex as well as disability, transgender individuals can currently seek
protection under the Fair Housing Act “based on non-conformity with gender stereotypes.”
Ending Housing Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Individuals and
Their Families, Enriching and Strengthening Our Nation, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp 
/LGBT_Housing_Discrimination [http://perma.cc/X3BH-UGJT]; see also 24 C.F.R.
§§ 5.105-06 (prohibiting discrimination based on “gender identity” under Fair Housing
Act). Disability coverage would provide transgender individuals with a second path to re­
covery under the Fair Housing Act as well as additional protections not afforded in the sex
discrimination context, namely, reasonable accommodations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a)(3)(B) (discussing “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services” for people with disabilities).
92. A�er excluding “transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments” from the ADA in 1990, Congress passed an identical exclusion to the Rehabil­
itation Act two years later. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) (excluding “transsexualism” and
“gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments”); H.R. REP. NO. 102­
973, at 158 (1992) (discussing an amendment to the Rehabilitation Act); see also 29 U.S.C.
§§ 705(20)(B) (“[T]he term ‘individual with a disability’ means, for purposes of [inter alia, 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794)] . . . any person who has a disa­
bility as defined in [the ADA, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 12102)].”).
93. See supra notes 12, 47-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Blatt decision, the amicus
brief in Blatt, and the Trump Administration’s Statement of Interest in Doe v. Arrisi, all of
which support coverage of gender dysphoria under the ADA as a matter of statutory inter­
pretation).
94. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (2012) (prohibiting federal agencies and recipients of federal
funds from discriminating based on disability); see, e.g., Dzurenda Complaint, supra note 87, 
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It also means that the Rehabilitation Act’s affirmative action requirements for 
people with disabilities should apply to individuals with gender dysphoria.95 
conclusion
For over twenty-five years, the ADA deprived transgender people of its pro­
tections by excluding “gender identity disorders.” As a result of this exclusion,
transgender litigants have not invoked the ADA’s protections, relying instead
on sex discrimination law.96 But this is changing. In Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that being transgender is not a medical
condition, but gender dysphoria is—and it is therefore not excluded from the
ADA. For the first time ever, a court has ruled that people who have, had, or are
perceived as having gender dysphoria are covered by the ADA. The Depart­
ment of Justice under both the Obama and Trump Administrations, moreover,
has reached the same result—albeit by different reasoning.
Blatt’s historic holding will reverberate beyond the facts of that case, setting
the stage for ADA challenges to a broad range of discrimination against
transgender people. In the employment and education contexts, the ADA will
supplement the protections provided by sex discrimination law through its
unique requirement of reasonable accommodation. Where sex discrimination
law does not reach, such as in the prisoner rights and public accommodations
contexts, the ADA can fill important gaps, providing a remedy to many of the
problems created by anti-transgender laws and policies. The door is also open
for transgender litigants to begin challenging gender dysphoria discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act. Notwithstanding the
well-intentioned concerns of some transgender rights advocates, disability
rights coverage of gender dysphoria does not pathologize transgender identity
or brand transgender people as incapable of functioning. Rather, it provides a
legal remedy that should never have been denied: comprehensive anti-
discrimination protection for a serious, stigmatized medical condition.
¶ 213 (alleging gender dysphoria discrimination by the Connecticut Department of Children
and Families under the Rehabilitation Act, and stating that the agency “accepts federal fi­
nancial assistance”).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (affirmative action by federal government); id. § 793 (affirmative ac­
tion by federal contractors).
96. Notably, transgender litigants have successfully pursued legal protection under state disabil­
ity laws, the vast majority of which do not exclude gender identity disorders. See Barry et al.,
supra note 32, at 523-24 (discussing the forty states that do not exclude gender identity dis­
orders from their disability antidiscrimination laws).
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Time will tell how far this new path of legal protection will take
transgender people, but one thing is for sure: we are at last moving in the right
direction. Disability rights law is finally catching up with medical science to
protect the lives and health of transgender individuals.
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